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I. INTRODUCTION
Law has reached its finest moments when it has freed man from the unlim-
ited discretion of some ruler, some civil or military official, some bureau-
crat.  Where discretion is absolute, man has always suffered.  At times, it has
been his property that has been invaded; at times, his privacy; at times, his
* Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Immigrants’ Rights at Penn-
sylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. See SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, http://
law.psu.edu/faculty/resident_faculty/wadhia (last visited January 17, 2013).  I recognize
Hiroshi Motomura, Michael Ovias, Jill Family, Deborah Smith, Mary Kenney, Rachel E. Ro-
senbloom, David A. Martin, Lenni Benson, Stephen Manning, and Marisa Taney for providing
comments on an earlier draft of this Article.  My appreciation goes to scholars at the Immigra-
tion Law Teachers Workshop held at Hofstra School of Law for commenting on an earlier draft
of this Article.  I thank Dean Phillip McConnaughay for his continues support for my profes-
sional development and to Stephen Coccorese and Ria Pereira for their excellent research
assistance.  I am grateful for the greatest sources of my happiness—Hemal, Devyani and
Neelesh.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLA\16\HLA104.txt unknown Seq: 2 26-JUN-13 14:58
40 Harvard Latino Law Review [Vol. 16
liberty of movement; at times, his freedom of thought; at times, his life.  Ab-
solute discretion is a ruthless master.  It is more destructive of freedom than
any of man’s other inventions. — United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98,
101 (1951).
Consider Sara Martinez, 47, whose daughter is an American citi-
zen.  Since arriving from Ecuador, Ms. Martinez has paid her
taxes, learned English, and never broken a law, according to the
New York Immigration Coalition, which has taken up her case.  In
January 2011, she was on a bus in Rochester with her daughter
when three border patrol agents asked her for identification.  She
could produce only her Ecuadorean passport, and was arrested.
She has applied to Immigration and Customs Enforcement for
prosecutorial discretion three times and been denied, without ex-
planation, even though she meets new criteria for such discretion:
she has close ties to the community and is not a threat to public
safety.  Ms. Martinez’s six-year-old daughter has suffered from
nightmares, had trouble sleeping and eating and expressed fear
that the “police” will come again and take away her mother (who
is not in detention while the case is pending) for good.1
For Sara, and for the unknown number of individuals “denied”
prosecutorial discretion by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),2
the conventional legal conclusion has been that such decisions are commit-
ted to the agency’s absolute “discretion” under the Administrative Proce-
dures Act (APA), are barred by the Immigration and Nationality Act, and,
for both of these reasons, are immune from judicial review.  Judicial review
authorizes courts to review both legislation and executive actions for com-
pliance with the law.3  Two important principles that emerge from the judi-
cial review function are: the “rule of law,” or the extent to which judges are
charged with examining whether particular actions are in compliance with
the law; and “separation of powers,” which is itself recognized by the limits
placed on the issues judges will hear and the standards they will apply even
with such review.
1 Hirokazu Yoshikawa & Carola Suárez-Orozco, Deporting Parents Hurts Kids, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 20, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/21/opinion/deporting-
parents-ruins-kids.html?_r=1&ref=opinion.
2 As described in greater detail in the Introduction, the Department of Homeland Security
is the immigration agency responsible for enforcing the nation’s immigration laws.  Pursuant to
section 103(a) of the immigration code, also known as the Immigration and Nationality Act,
“The Secretary of Homeland Security shall be charged with the administration and enforce-
ment of this Act and all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens
. . . .” INA § 103(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2010).
3 See ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN & RICHARD E. LEVY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AGENCY AC-
TION IN LEGAL CONTEXT 146-47 (Foundation Press, 1st ed. 2010).
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Building upon my research on the role of prosecutorial discretion in
immigration law,4 this Article examines the role of the judiciary in
prosecutorial discretion decisions.  This Article argues that as a normative
(and possibly a legal) matter, certain prosecutorial decisions made by the
DHS should be afforded judicial review under the standards promulgated
under the APA.  These decisions may include pursuing an appeal, joining in
a motion to reopen removal proceedings, joining in a motion to recalendar
removal proceedings, cancelling a detainer, cancelling a Notice to Appear
and releasing an individual from detention.  This Article begins with an
overview of prosecutorial discretion in immigration matters.  Part II provides
a primer on the organization of the immigration agency.  Part III analyzes
the relevant statutory sections within the Administrative Procedures Act
(APA) and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the formative
case law applying such sections, and argues that APA review is available for
certain prosecutorial discretion decisions.  Part IV considers the normative
benefits of prosecutorial discretion review and explores potential designs for
such review.
The role of prosecutorial discretion in immigration matters is well es-
tablished,5 and generally refers to the agency’s determination of whether or
not the immigration laws should be enforced against a particular individual
4 See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration
Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243 (2010) [hereinafter The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion];
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Sharing Secrets: Examining Deferred Action and Transparency in
Immigration Law, 10 NEW HAMP. L. REV. 1 (2011) [hereinafter Sharing Secrets].
5 Since 1975, the immigration agency has published documents on the use of prosecutorial
discretion in immigration matters.  Following a lawsuit by music legend John Lennon, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) published an “Operations Instruction” on the
use of prosecutorial discretion and publicly introduced the agency’s authority to “defer” en-
forcement in cases involving “(1) advanced or tender age; (2) many years’ presence in the
United States; (3) physical or mental condition requiring care or treatment in the United States;
(4) family situation in the United States- effect of expulsion; and/or (5) criminal, immoral or
subversive activities or affiliations- recent conduct.” (Legacy) Immigration and Naturalization
Service, Operations Instructions, O.I. § 103.1(a)(1)(ii) (1975).  The O.I. was tweaked in 1981
to “clarify” that decisions by the agency to exercise prosecutorial discretion were a matter of
administrative convenience, as opposed to being a substantive benefit.  The various memo-
randa issued by DHS on prosecutorial discretion have been summarized in previous articles
and will not be repeated here. See, e.g., Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, supra
note 4.  For a history of the litigation leading up to the changes in the O.I., see Leon Wildes,
The Operations Instructions of the Immigration Service: Internal Guides or Binding Rules?, 17
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 99, 101 (1980).  While the O.I. was eventually repealed by the agency, the
standard continued to be applied by the agency. See, e.g., Memorandum from Doris Meissner,
Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Service, on Exercising Prosecutorial Discre-
tion (Nov. 17, 2000), available at http://iwp.legalmomentum.org/reference/additional-materi-
als/immigration/enforcement-detention-and-criminal-justice/government-documents/
22092970-INS-Guidance-Memo-Prosecutorial-Discretion-Doris-Meissner-11-7-00.pdf; INS
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS: ARREST, DETENTION,
PROCESSING, AND REMOVAL, Part X (1997);  (Legacy) Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Operations Instructions, former O.I. § 242.1(a)(22) (withdrawn June 24, 1997) (stating that
deferred action is “an act of administrative choice to give some cases lower priority and in no
way an entitlement”).
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or group of persons.6  The agency making a “favorable” exercise of
prosecutorial discretion means that the immigration agency is refraining
from enforcing the full scope of the law against a person or group of per-
sons.  Prosecutorial discretion may be exercised by DHS at any stage of
immigration enforcement, including, but not limited to, interrogation, arrest,
charging, detention, removal proceedings, appeals, or after a removal order
has become final.7
The theory of prosecutorial discretion rests on both humanitarian and
economic grounds.  First, prosecutorial discretion recognizes that certain
noncitizens bearing positive attributes and qualities have no formal relief
available under the immigration laws.  Second, prosecutorial discretion ac-
knowledges that the number of noncitizens who are technically “deportable”
under the immigration laws is much larger than the immigration agency can
successfully handle with its available resources.  Estimates suggest that the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency has the resources to remove
about 400,000 people per year, or about 4% of the deportable population
living in the United States.8  Thus, prosecutorial discretion is an important
tool that enables the agency to manage and prioritize the more than 11 mil-
lion noncitizens who are unauthorized and residing in the United States.
While it is important to understand the relationship between legislative re-
forms (i.e. legalization) and prosecutorial discretion policy, the relationship
should not be overstated.  Even with broad statutory reforms, prosecutorial
discretion is critical to ensuring that individuals with compelling equities
and qualities that society finds desirable are protected from removal while
6 See, e.g., Memorandum from John Morton, Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration
Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens
to all Field Office Directors, all Special Agents in Charge, and all Chief Counsel, U.S. Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement (June 17, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/
secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf.  For a broader discussion about
the role of prosecutorial discretion in immigration law, and relevant lessons one can draw from
the administrative and criminal law contexts, see Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discre-
tion, supra note 4. See also, Leon Wildes, The United States Immigration Service v. John
Lennon: The Cultural Lag, 40 BROOK. L. REV. 279 (1974); Leon Wildes, The Nonpriority
Program of the Immigration and Naturalization Service Goes Public: The Litigative Use of the
Freedom of Information Act, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 42 (1977).
7 See Memorandum from John Morton, supra note 6, at 5.  For a discussion about discre-
tion beyond the decision to “prosecute,” see Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters:
Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58
UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1842 (2011) (“First, the discretion that matters in immigration enforce-
ment has not been the discretion to prosecute, but the discretion to arrest.  Second, arrests for
civil or criminal violations do not lead separately to two systems of prosecution.  Though
arrests for criminal immigration violations can lead to criminal prosecution, the federal gov-
ernment may choose to initiate only civil removal proceedings.”).
8 Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Secretary, ICE, on Civil Immigration En-
forcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens to all ICE em-
ployees (June 30, 2010), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2010/civil-
enforcement-priorities.pdf.
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the individuals who present true dangers to the community or risks to na-
tional security are targeted for removal.9
The increased exposure of prosecutorial discretion in immigration mat-
ters since 2010 was triggered by a stalemate in Congress over legislative
immigration reform, a library of associated policies and procedures by ICE,10
and increased monitoring and advocacy by the private bar and noncitizens
seeking tools for avoiding deportation and related consequences.11  Mean-
while, select members of Congress and commentators labeled the agency’s
use of prosecutorial discretion as an “administrative amnesty” and interro-
gated the DHS Secretary about the agency’s use of prosecutorial discretion.12
The final clause of the memorandum issued by ICE on June 17, 2011, states:
As there is no right to the favorable exercise of discretion by the
agency, nothing in this memorandum should be construed to pro-
hibit the apprehension, detention or removal of any alien unlaw-
fully in the United States or to limit the legal authority of ICE or
any of its personnel to enforce federal immigration law. Similarly,
this memorandum, which may be modified, superseded or re-
scinded at any time without notice, is not intended to, does not,
and may not be relied upon to create any right or benefit, substan-
tive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any adminis-
trative, civil or criminal matter.13
9 See Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 4.
10 DHS issued several memoranda and documents in 2010 and 2011 to reaffirm its author-
ity to exercise prosecutorial discretion, clarify its “civil enforcement priorities,” and outline
the kinds of factors immigration officers and attorneys should consider when deciding whether
prosecutorial discretion is appropriate.  For a summary of the prosecutorial discretion docu-
mentation issued in the year 2011, and related links, see Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia,
Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Agencies: A Year in Review, 2012 EMERGING ISSUES
6173 (Jan. 2012), available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/immigration-law/blogs/
emergingissues/archive/2012/01/12/prosecutorial-discretion-in-immigration-agencies-a-year-
in-review.aspx.
11 AILA, PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION SURVEY (2011), http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/
LMMTBSG; AILA/AIC JOINT REPORT, HOLDING DHS ACCOUNTABLE ON PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION (Nov. 2011), available at http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=37615;
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION: COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION
SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND PROFESSIONAL-
ISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES (2001), available at http://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/migrated/media/nosearch/immigration_reform_executive_summary_0125
10.authcheckdam.pdf.
12 See “Dear Colleague,” Letter from Lamar Smith, House Judiciary Committee Chair-
man, to members of Congress (June 23, 2011), available at http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.
com/Smith_DearColleague.pdf; H.R. 2497, 112th Cong. (2011), available at http://www.gpo.
gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr2497ih/pdf/BILLS-112hr2497ih.pdf; S. 1380, 112th Cong. (2011),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112s1380is/pdf/BILLS-112s1380is.pdf.
See also Letter from Lamar Smith, House Judiciary Committee Chairman, & Robert Aderholt,
Homeland Security Subcommittee Chairman, to Janet Napolitano, DHS Secretary (July 5,
2011), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/news/pdfs/Administrative%20Amnesty.pdf.
13 Memorandum from John Morton, supra note 6, at 6.
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The language above reflects the agency’s position that no prosecutorial dis-
cretion decision should be seen as a right or a legally enforceable benefit
granted by U.S. law.
II. PRIMER ON IMMIGRATION STRUCTURE AND ADJUDICATIONS
Created by Congress after the attacks of September 11, 2011, the De-
partment of Homeland Security (DHS) is a cabinet-level agency responsible
for a diversity of functions including the processing of affirmative immigra-
tion benefits applications, border enforcement, and interior immigration en-
forcement.14  The three DHS units responsible for these immigration
functions are Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement (ICE), and United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS).15  CBP, ICE and USCIS all have jurisdiction to issue
charging documents or Notices to Appear (NTA).16
Removal proceedings are triggered when DHS files the NTA with an
immigration court. These courts are adjudicatory bodies for the Executive
Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), an agency within the Department of
Justice (DOJ).17  Under this system, immigration judges preside over re-
moval proceedings and enforce federal immigration laws. In fiscal year
2011, these immigration judges oversaw 330,756 removal proceedings.18
14 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/index.shtm (last visited July
19, 2012).
15 U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, http://cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/ (last visited
July 19, 2012); U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/ (last vis-
ited July 19, 2012); U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/ (last
visited July 19, 2012).
16 See, e.g., Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002);
Memorandum from William J. Howard, Principal Legal Advisor to All Office of the Principal
Legal Advisor General Counsel, on Prosecutorial Discretion (Oct. 24, 2005) (on file with au-
thor); Memorandum from Doris Meissner, supra note 5, at 2. See also INA § 239, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229 (2006).  Some noncitizens are administratively removed from the United States without
formal removal proceedings.  For example, under the INA § 235, arriving noncitizens who
enter an airport without proper documents or false documents can be summarily removed by
the DHS, and do not have a legal right to review by an immigration judge or federal court.
Similarly, under the INA § 217, individuals who enter the United States under the “visa
waiver program” (VWP) are required to “waive” their right to appeal or review in a court as a
condition of their admission under the VWP.  An interesting point is how prosecutorial discre-
tion impacts individuals like the VWP entrant or the individual subject to expedited removal,
especially if such persons possess the kinds of equities and qualities that are worthy of a
favorable grant of prosecutorial discretion.
17 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, http://www.jus-
tice.gov/eoir/ (last visited July 19, 2012). See also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14 (2003) (“Jurisdiction
and commencement of proceedings. (a) Jurisdiction vests, and proceedings before an Immigra-
tion Judge commence, when a charging document is filed with the Immigration Court by the
Service.  The charging document must include a certificate showing service on the opposing
party pursuant to § 1003.32 which indicates the Immigration Court in which the charging
document is filed.”).  It should be noted that DHS also may exercise prosecutorial discretion
by cancelling an NTA even before it is filed with the Immigration Court.
18 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2011 STATIS-
TICAL YEARBOOK, C3 (Feb. 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy11syb.
pdf.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLA\16\HLA104.txt unknown Seq: 7 26-JUN-13 14:58
2013] The Immigration Prosecutor and the Judge 45
While this Article is limited to the review of prosecutorial discretion deci-
sions made by DHS, a description of the immigration courts aids in under-
standing how prosecutorial discretion decisions fit within the overall
immigration structure.
Discretion is often pivotal in determining whether an individual is
placed in removal proceedings.  In removal proceedings, most cases revolve
not around whether the noncitizen is removable as charged, but rather
around whether she is eligible for one of the various forms of relief from
removal, such as asylum, cancellation of removal, or adjustment of status.19
Most of these statutory pardons include a discretionary component and, as a
practical matter, enable the immigration judge to deny relief even when a
noncitizen meets all of the statutory criteria for such relief.20  At the removal
hearing, an immigration judge will normally sustain or dismiss charges made
by DHS against the noncitizen, and, if appropriate, will determine if a nonci-
tizen is eligible for formal relief from removal.21
Once removal proceedings have begun, an immigration judge may also
adjudicate certain procedural requests such as motions to administratively
close, postpone, dismiss or reopen a removal proceeding.22  Undoubtedly,
DHS’s decision to commence removal proceedings by filing an NTA with
the immigration court represents the defining moment during which
prosecutorial discretion can be exercised to save the government the re-
sources of administrative hearings and possible appeals.  The decision not to
file the NTA also recognizes the equities and humanitarian concerns of
noncitizens who are ineligible for formal immigration relief.23  Decisions by
19 See INA §§ 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2006); INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2006); 208, 8
U.S.C. § 1158 (2006).
20 Outside of the removal context, a DHS officer may engage in a similar exercise of
“adjudicatory discretion” when considering a waiver of inadmissibility or application for im-
migration benefit. 8 C.F.R. § 212.18 (2008).
21 Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/
eoir/ocijinfo.htm (last updated April 2011).
22 See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23 (1997); 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2 (2004); Matter of Gutierrez, 21
I&N Dec. 479, 484 (BIA 1996), available at www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/vol21/3286.pdf;
Matter of GNC, 22 I&N Dec. 281, 308 (BIA 1998), available at www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/
intdec/vol22/3366.pdf.
23 See, e.g., Memorandum from John Morton, supra note 6; ABA Commission on Immi-
gration, Reforming the Immigration System: Proposals to Promote Independence, Fairness,
Efficiency, and Professionalism in the Adjudication of Removal Cases, 1-18 (2010), available
at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/commission_on_immigration/
coi_complete_full_report.pdf.  Notably, the ABA Commission on Immigration has recom-
mended that DHS attorneys review NTAs issued by the ICE, CIS, and CBP to determine if
removal proceedings are appropriate.  The ABA Commission on Immigration has issued a
related resolution and, in an accompanying report to this resolution, has stated:
Notices to Appear are issued in a variety of agency contexts by CBP, USCIS and
ICE and are subject to substantial discretion.  Apart from NTAs required by regula-
tion, there appears to be no consistent policy guidance outlining factors to be consid-
ered in exercising discretion in the issuance of NTAs.  Consequently, discretion is
exercised with disparate results.  We recommend that, in DHS local offices with
sufficient attorney resources, the approval of a DHS lawyer be required for the issu-
ance of all discretionary NTAs, and that the DHS lawyer’s approval be granted on a
case-by-case basis.  This should help produce more consistent outcomes and would
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immigration judges may be appealed by either the government or the nonci-
tizen by filing a Notice to Appeal with another EOIR body known as the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).24  Certain decisions by the BIA are
published as “precedent” and are binding on all immigration judges and
Board members.25
Noncitizens generally have a right to pursue judicial review following a
final order of removal unless one of the statutory exceptions applies.  Under
the immigration statute, noncitizens are barred from seeking review in immi-
gration cases involving most crimes, many discretionary decisions, and ex-
pedited removal orders.26  Legal scholars and judges have long examined the
role of judicial review in immigration matters, and also criticized the im-
pacts of the “plenary power” doctrine27 and statutory deletions of judicial
review for certain immigration cases.28  Absent from this scholarship is a
serious examination of the judiciary’s role in immigration decisions involv-
ing prosecutorial discretion.  I attribute this absence primarily to two factors.
First, there seems to be a silent concession that prosecutorial discretion deci-
sions are automatically barred from judicial review because of the plain lan-
guage of the Immigration and Nationality Act and because of the judicial
review “exceptions” in the Administrative Procedures Act and the cases that
analyze these sections. Second, I see this acquiescence as the effect of read-
ing more than a decade’s worth of memoranda by the immigration agency
declaring that no prosecutorial discretion provides a procedural or substan-
tive benefit or a right.
help to ensure that decisions about the issuance of NTAs would take into account
developments in the applicable law.
See ABA COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REPORT TO HOUSE OF DELEGATES, 114A (Feb. 2010),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/Immigration/PublicDocu-
ments/114A.authcheckdam.pdf.
24 8 C.F.R. § 1003 (2003).
25 See 8 C.F.R. § 1103.3(c) (2003).
26 See INA § 242(a)(2)(A-C), 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006).
27 Defined simply to illustrate the Legislative and Executive Branches’ “plenary” author-
ity over immigration law.  For a broader explanation, see Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and
Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV.
1615, 1616 (2000).
28 See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and
Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 18 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 137 (1997) [hereinafter
Surrounding the Hole]; Daniel Kanstroom, The Better Part of Valor: The REAL ID Act, Dis-
cretion, and the “Rule” of Immigration Law, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 161, 163 (2006); Stephen
H. Legomsky, Political Asylum and the Theory of Judicial Review, 73 MINNESOTA L. REV.
1205, 1208 (1989) [hereinafter Political Asylum]; Jill Family, A Broader View Of The Immi-
gration Adjudication Problem, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 595, 608-09 (2009);  Lenni Benson, Mak-
ing Paper Dolls: How Restrictions on Judicial Review and the Administrative Process
Increase Immigration Cases in the Federal Courts, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 37, 39 (2006);
Legomsky, Fear and Loathing, supra note 27, at 1616.
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III. MAKING THE CASE FOR APA REVIEW OVER PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION DECISIONS
On the basis of what the courts know today about leaving adminis-
tration to administrators but at the same time providing an effec-
tive check to protect against abuses, should the courts not take a
fresh look at the tradition that prevents them from reviewing the
prosecuting function? KENNETH DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE
211 (1969).
For more than a decade, the immigration agency has relied on select
provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Administrative Pro-
cedures Act, and court opinions applying these provisions to support its po-
sition that prosecutorial discretion decisions in immigration matters are
immune from judicial review.  Specifically, the immigration agency has de-
pended on the conclusions in Heckler v. Chaney and ADC v. Reno to argue
that prosecutorial actions are immune from judicial review.29  To illustrate,
the November 17, 2000, INS Memorandum on prosecutorial discretion
stated:
Courts recognize that prosecutorial discretion applies in the civil,
administrative arena just as it does in criminal law.  Moreover the
Supreme Court “has recognized on several occasions over many
years that an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce,
whether through civil or criminal process, is a design generally
committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.” Heckler v. Chaney.
Both Congress and the Supreme Court have recently reaffirmed
that the concept of prosecutorial discretion applies to INS enforce-
ment activities, such as whether to place an individual in deporta-
tion proceedings.  INA section 242(g); Reno v. American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee.  The “discretion” in prosecutorial
29 See, e.g., Memorandum from Doris Meissner, supra note 5, at 3.  Prior to Heckler v.
Chaney and ADC v. Reno, several federal circuit courts took up the question of whether the
former Operations Instruction governing “deferred action” operates as a substantive right of
the noncitizen. See, e.g., Pasquini v. Morris, 700 F.2d 658, 662 (11th Cir. 1983); Nicholas v.
INS, 590 F.2d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1979).  I do not review these cases in this Article because
they do not factor in the impacts of Heckler, AADC, or the amendments to the INA and also
because they have been summarized in previous scholarship. See, e.g., Leon Wildes, The De-
ferred Action Program of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services: A Possible
Remedy for Impossible Cases, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 819, 821 (2004); Wadhia, The Role of
Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 4, at 280.  In many, if not most, of these cases, there was
little question about whether the petitioner noncitizens had a procedural right to review over
their denials of deferred action. See, e.g., Pasquini v. Morris, 700 F.2d 658, 663 (11th Cir.
1983) (“Although the internal operating instruction confers no substantive rights on the alien-
applicant, it does confer the procedural right to be considered for such status upon application.
Zacharakis’s application was considered and denied on October 10, 1980.  Pasquini’s applica-
tion for deferred action status was considered and denied on June 24, 1980.  Thus, both aliens’
procedural rights were met by the INS.”). For a broader account of how “deferred action”
operates in the current immigration design, see Wadhia, Sharing Secrets, supra note 4.
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discretion means that prosecutorial decisions are not subject to ju-
dicial review or reversal, except in extremely narrow
circumstances.30
This Article challenges the notion that every prosecutorial discretion
decision is barred from federal court review.  Once the immigration agency
decides to publish policy guidance and publicly announces that it will not
pursue particular kinds of enforcement actions against certain individuals,
judicial review may be appropriate in situations where the agency has poten-
tially abused its own standards.  Moreover, this Article shows how the col-
lection of guidance on prosecutorial discretion since Reno creates a highly
meaningful standard by which federal judges could review unlawful deci-
sions.  The agency’s guidance post-Reno is summarized below to illustrate
the extent to which the prosecutorial discretion directives are far more devel-
oped than the directives governing other agency actions in which the courts
have found APA review to be available.  In 2000, former INS Commissioner
Doris Meissner issued comprehensive guidance on prosecutorial discretion
in a memorandum titled “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion.”31  The
Meissner Memo instructed that “[s]ervice officers are not only authorized
by law but expected to exercise discretion in a judicious manner at all stages
of the enforcement process—from planning investigations to enforcing final
orders—subject to their chains of command and to the particular responsibil-
ities and authority applicable to their specific position.”32  The Meissner
Memo outlined a generous list of humanitarian factors that officers should
consider in making prosecutorial discretion decisions and made broad refer-
ences to criminal law to explain the legality of such discretion.33
After the INS was abolished by statute and replaced by the new, cabinet
level DHS in 2003, Congress transferred the authority to exercise
prosecutorial discretion to ICE, CBP, and USCIS components.34  During the
first several years of its tenure, ICE and USCIS issued a few documents
relating to the agency’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion with respect to
certain cases, such as those involving widows and widowers of U.S. citizens
or their unmarried children under 21 years old, as well as with respect to
arrest and custody decisions made for nursing mothers who are without a
legal immigration status.35  Similarly, ICE issued a memorandum in 2005
30 Memorandum from Doris Meissner, supra note 5, at 3.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 1.
33 Id. at 7.
34 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002); INA
§ 103, 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (2006).
35 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, DHS Establishes Interim Relief for
Widows of U.S. Citizens (June 9, 2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/
pr_1244578412501.shtm; Memorandum from Julie L. Myers, Assistant Secretary,
Prosecutorial and Custody Discretion (Nov. 7, 2007) (on file with author).  For a lengthier
analysis of these early memos, see Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 4,
at 295; MARY KENNEY, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION: HOW
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targeted at its legal advisors and underscoring the breadth of the “universe
of opportunities” for ICE to exercise prosecutorial discretion.36
Beginning in June 2010, ICE published comprehensive memoranda
about its civil enforcement priorities.37  On June 17, 2011, ICE Chief John
Morton issued the agency’s most comprehensive guidance on prosecutorial
discretion since the inception of DHS (“June 17 Morton Memo”).38  The
guide included an expanded list of factors the agency should consider when
rendering prosecutorial discretion decisions, described the various actions
that constitute prosecutorial discretion, and stated a preference for such dis-
cretion to be exercised as early in the process as possible.39  The June 17
Morton Memo stated:
While ICE may exercise prosecutorial discretion at any stage of an
enforcement proceeding, it is generally preferable to exercise such
discretion as early in the case or proceeding as possible in order to
preserve government resources that would otherwise be expended
in pursuing the enforcement proceeding.  As was more extensively
elaborated on in the Howard Memorandum on Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion, the universe of opportunities to exercise prosecutorial dis-
cretion is large. It may be exercised at any stage of the
proceedings.40
As a companion to the June 17 Morton Memo, the Secretary of DHS
and the White House “announced” a prosecutorial discretion policy (“Au-
gust 18 policy”) in which DHS and DOJ would work together to review
some 300,000 cases pending removal before EOIR.41  Following several
months of silence, ICE issued additional documentation to implement the
August 18 policy and throughout these documents identified the June 17
Morton Memo as the “cornerstone” document providing guidance to ICE
TO ADVOCATE FOR YOUR CLIENT, (June 24, 2011), available at http://www.aila.org/content/
default.aspx?docid=33749.
36 Memorandum from William J. Howard, supra note 16, at 2.
37 See Memorandum from John Morton, Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs En-
forcement, on Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and
Removal of Aliens to all ICE Employees (Mar. 2, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/
doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf.
38 Memorandum from John Morton, supra note 6.  ICE issued a second memoradum on
June 17 specific to certain plaintiffs, victims, and witnesses. See Memorandum from John
Morton, Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Crime Victims, Witnesses and Plaintiffs (Jun. 17,
2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/domestic-violence.pdf.
For a detailed summary of the June 17 Morton Memo, see Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The
Morton Memo and Prosecutorial Discretion: An Overview, IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER
(July 20, 2011), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/special-reports/morton-memo-and-
prosecutorial-discretion-overview.
39 Memorandum from John Morton, supra note 6.
40 Id. at 5.
41 Letter from Janet Napolitano, Secretary of the Dep’t of Homeland Security, to Sen. Dick
Durbin, at 3 (Aug. 18, 2011), available at http://durbin.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/
serve?File_id=1180a746-c6d4-4fe9-b11f-cf9be50b6226.
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attorneys.42  ICE’s decision to move or join a party in a motion to administra-
tively close a case is one form of prosecutorial discretion and has been sin-
gled out in many of the ICE documents implementing the August 18 policy.
For example, one memorandum from the ICE Office for the Principal Legal
Advisor (OPLA) states:
The criteria set forth in the Guidance should prompt particular care
and consideration and are intended to aid attorneys in identifying
the cases most likely to be either eligible or ineligible for a
favorable exercise of discretion.  Based on this review, ICE attor-
neys should review whether the proceedings before EOIR should
continue or whether prosecutorial discretion in the form of admin-
istrative closure is appropriate.43
“Administrative closure” is a procedure by which an IJ or the BIA removes
a case from its docket as a matter of “administrative convenience.”44
A. The Administrative Procedure Act Provides Broad Review
Over Agency Actions
The APA is a federal statute that allows an individual to sue a federal
agency based on an unlawful agency action.  An APA lawsuit is normally
filed in federal district court.  The APA provides review to “[a] person suf-
fering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or ag-
grieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute.”45
Section 704 identifies the actions reviewable as “[a]gency action made re-
42 See, e.g., Memorandum from Peter Vincent, Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, on Case-By-Case Review of Incoming and Certain Pending Cases
to all Chief Counsel and Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, at 2 (Nov. 17, 2011), available
at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/case-by-case-review-incoming-cer-
tain-pending-cases-memorandum.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. IMMIGRATION
AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, GUIDANCE TO ICE ATTORNEYS REVIEWING THE CBP, USCIS,
AND ICE CASES BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW (2011), available
at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/guidance-to-ice-attorneys-review-
ing-cbp-uscis-ice-cases-before-eoir.pdf; DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. IMMIGRATION
AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, NEXT STEPS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION MEMORANDUM AND THE AUGUST 18TH ANNOUNCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION EN-
FORCEMENT PRIORITIES (2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/
pros-discretion-next-steps.pdf; Wadhia, Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Agencies,
supra note 10; THE LEGAL ACTION CENTER AND ALEXSA ALONZO, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION
COUNCIL, DHS REVIEW OF LOW PRIORITY CASES FOR PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION (updated
Feb. 13, 2012), available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/DHS_Review_
of_Low_Priority_Cases_2-13-12.pdf.
43 Vincent, supra note 42, at 2.  “Administrative closure” is a procedure by which an IJ or
the BIA removes a case from its docket as a matter of “administrative convenience.”
44 See Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688, 690 (BIA 2012), available at http://www.
justice.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/vol25/3740.pdf.  Administrative closure is not specified in the INA
or in federal regulations, though it has long been used by the EOIR to regulate its docket.  The
OPLA Memorandum notifies ICE attorneys that a “template” joint motion to administratively
close proceedings is available.
45 Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
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viewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other ade-
quate remedy in a court . . . .”46  Enacted by Congress in 1946, the APA had
four central purposes: (1) to require agencies to keep the public informed of
their organization, procedures, and rules; (2) to provide for public participa-
tion in the rulemaking process; (3) to establish uniform standards for the
conduct of formal rulemaking and adjudication; and (4) to define the scope
of judicial review.47  The judicial review provisions of the APA are codified
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706.
The breadth of judicial review under the APA is illustrated by the semi-
nal Supreme Court case of Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner.48 Abbott in-
volved thirty-seven individual drug manufacturers and one pharmaceutical
association challenging regulations requiring that labels and advertisements
for prescription drugs bearing proprietary names for the drugs or the ingredi-
ents carry the corresponding “established name” every time the name is
used.49  The petitioners argued that the regulations exceeded the Commis-
sioner’s authority under the statute and were subject to judicial resolution.50
The Government argued that, pursuant to the first APA exception, no review
was available because the governing food and drug statute includes a special
review procedure for some regulations and therefore excluded review of the
others.51  The Court held that judicial review was available under the APA,
and that the impact of the food and drug regulations on the petitioners was
“sufficiently direct and immediate.”52  The Court noted that “[t]he legisla-
tive material elucidating that seminal act [the APA] manifests a congres-
sional intention that it cover a broad spectrum of administrative actions, and
this Court has echoed that theme by noting that the . . . ‘generous review
provisions’ must be given a ‘hospitable’ interpretation.”53
APA review has further received a “hospitable” interpretation in immi-
gration cases involving a motion to “reopen.”  A motion to “reopen” a re-
moval case is a discretionary decision ordinarily made by an immigration
court or the BIA in order to consider new facts or evidence in a removal case
where a decision has already been rendered.54  The details about motions to
reopen are specified in the immigration regulations, and generally require
the applicant to file a written motion and attach supporting documentation.55
The BIA has rendered several decisions pertaining to the scope and jurisdic-
tion of motions to reopen.56  The Supreme Court has concluded that federal
46 Id. § 704.
47 See Gary J. Edles, The Continuing Need for an Administrative Conference, 50 ADMIN.
L. REV. 101, 107 (1998).
48 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
49 Id. at 137-38.
50 Id. at 139.
51 Id. at 140-141.
52 Id. at 152.
53 Id. at 140.
54 8 CFR §§ 1003.2(c)(2), 1003.23.
55 See id. § 1003.23(3).
56 See, e.g., Matter of Velarde-Pacheco, 23 I&N Dec. 253 (BIA 2002); Matter of J-J-, 21
I&N Dec. 976 (BIA 1997);  Matter of L-O-G-, 21 I&N Dec. 413 (BIA 1996).
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courts have jurisdiction to review denials of motions to reopen deportation
proceedings and that such review will be based on an “abuse of discretion”
standard.57
In 2010, in Kucana v. Holder, the Court held that motions to reopen
decisions, made discretionary by the Attorney General, remain subject to
judicial review.58  The petitioner, Agron Kucana, moved to reopen his re-
moval proceedings based on new evidence in support of his asylum claim.59
The Board of Immigration Appeals denied his motion to reopen and the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction to review his
case because the INA precludes such review.60  The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to decide whether the preclusion language within INA
§ 242(a)(2)(B) applied only to determinations made by statute or also to de-
cisions made discretionary through regulations.61  In concluding that the reg-
ulation governing motions to reopen may be judicially reviewed, the Court
relied upon the longstanding “presumption favoring interpretations of stat-
utes [to] allow judicial review of administrative action,”62 stating:
Any lingering doubt about the proper interpretation of 8 U. S. C.
§1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) would be dispelled by a familiar principle of
statutory construction: the presumption favoring judicial review of
administrative action. When a statute is “reasonably susceptible to
divergent interpretation, we adopt the reading that accords with
traditional understandings and basic principles: that executive de-
terminations generally are subject to judicial review.”63
57 INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 105 (1988).
58 130 S. Ct. 827, 840 (2010).
59 Id. at 831. Kucana v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 534 (7th Cir. 2008).
60 See INA § 242(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (2006) (“Denials of Discretionary
Relief.-Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including sec-
tion 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections
1361 and 1651 of such title, and except as provided in subparagraph (D), and regardless of
whether the judgment, decision or action is made in removal proceedings, no court shall have
jurisdiction to review-
(i) judgment regarding the granting of relief under section 1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b,
1229c, or 1255 of this title, or
(ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Home-
land Security the authority for which is specified under this title to be in the discre-
tion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security, other than the
granting of relief under section 1158(a) of this title.”).
61 130 S. Ct. at 831.
62 Id. at 839.
63 Id. at 829-30. The Court went on:
Finally, we stress a paramount factor in the decision we render today.  By defining
the various jurisdictional bars by reference to other provisions in the INA itself,
Congress ensured that it, and only it, would limit the federal courts’ jurisdiction.  To
read § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) to apply to matters where discretion is conferred on the
Board by regulation, rather than on the Attorney General by statute, would ignore
that congressional design.  If the Seventh Circuit’s construction of
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) were to prevail, the Executive would have a free hand to shelter
its own decisions from abuse-of-discretion appellate court review simply by issuing
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B. Scope of APA Review Over Agency Actions
Even if a federal court assumes jurisdiction over DHS prosecutorial
discretion decisions, the scope and standard of review are pivotal.  If review
in a federal court is a means to a favorable outcome for the noncitizen, this
assumption of jurisdiction barely matters if courts apply too high a standard
of review.  Section 706 of the APA instructs a reviewing court to set aside
agency actions that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or oth-
erwise not in accordance with law.”64  Notably, the Supreme Court recently
applied this standard in Judulang v. Holder, and held that the “[t]he BIA’s
policy for applying §212(c) in deportation cases is ‘arbitrary and capricious’
under the Administrative Procedure Act . . . .”65  Though Judulang dealt with
an agency’s interpretation of a statute as opposed to a discretionary decision,
the case highlights the fundamental role of the judiciary and gives meaning
to the standard of review outlined in the APA.
Federal courts have also reviewed whether an immigration adjudicator’s
denial of a “continuance” was arbitrary and capricious.  A “continuance” is
a request that is normally made in writing to an immigration judge with
information about the time and date of a removal hearing, preferred dates
that a party is available to re-schedule such hearing, and reasons why a con-
tinuance is desired.  The decision to grant or deny a continuance is discre-
tionary and is governed by a regulation that states, “[t]he Immigration
Judge may grant a motion for continuance for good cause shown.”66  There
a regulation declaring those decisions “discretionary.”  Such an extraordinary dele-
gation of authority cannot be extracted from the statute Congress enacted.
Id. at 839-40.
64 Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006). The governing section of
APA reads in full:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions,
and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.  The
reviewing court shall –
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found
to be –
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accor-
dance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations, or short of
statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556
and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hear-
ing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial
de novo by the reviewing court . . . .
Id.
65 132 S. Ct. 476, 477 (2011).
66 8 CFR § 1003.29 (1992).  Some courts have analogized continuances to “administrative
closure.” See Garza-Moreno v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 239, 242 (6th Cir. 2007).
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is no form for such motions, but the EOIR has published information about
continuances in its Immigration Court Practice Manual.67  Similarly, the BIA
has interpreted the “good cause” standard.68
Although a grant of continuance is within the discretion of the immigra-
tion judge, it is well established that the BIA and federal courts do have
jurisdiction to review continuance decisions.69  In Hashmi v. Attorney Gen-
eral of the U.S., removal proceedings were continued several times for peti-
tioner Ajmal Hussain Shah Hashmi while his marriage-based petition (I-130
application) was pending.70  After eighteen months, the immigration judge
(IJ) denied another continuance because the case had been pending far
longer than the eight-month period suggested by the “case-completion
goals” set by the DOJ.71  The circuit court found that the IJ’s denial of a
motion for a continuance based on case-completion goals rather than on the
facts and circumstances of Hashmi’s case was arbitrary and an abuse of
discretion.72
The foregoing case law illuminates how courts might apply “arbitrary,”
“capricious,” and “abuse of discretion” standards to prosecutorial decisions
in immigration matters.  Tempting as it is to identify any prosecutorial dis-
cretion denial as an “abuse” where the noncitizen meets some or several of
the positive factors identified in the DHS memoranda about prosecutorial
discretion, the directives themselves offer enough flexibility for the immi-
gration officer to reject seemingly strong cases.73  On the other hand, some
67 EOIR, IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL 96 (Apr. 1, 2008), available at http://
www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/OCIJPracManual/Practice%20Manual%20Final_compressedPDF.pdf
(“ (a) Motion to continue.—A request for a continuance of any hearing should be made by
written motion.  Oral motions to continue are discouraged. The motion should set forth in
detail the reasons for the request and, if appropriate, be supported by evidence. See Chapter
5.2(e) (Evidence).  It should also include the date and time of the hearing, as well as preferred
dates that the party is available to re-schedule the hearing.  However, parties should be mindful
that the Immigration Court retains discretion to schedule continued cases on dates that the
court deems appropriate.”).
68 See Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. 785, 788 (BIA 2009) (“In determining whether
good cause exists to continue such proceedings, a variety of factors may be considered, includ-
ing, but not limited to: (1) the Department of Homeland Security’s response to the motion to
continue; (2) whether the underlying visa petition is prima facie approvable; (3) the respon-
dent’s statutory eligibility for adjustment of status; (4) whether the respondent’s application for
adjustment merits a favorable exercise of discretion; and (5) the reason for the continuance and
any other relevant procedural factors.”); see also Matter of Rajah, 25 I&N Dec. 127, 130 (BIA
2009).
69 See, e.g., Masih v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 2008); Hashmi v. Att’y Gen.
of U.S., 531 F.3d 256, 262 (3rd Cir. 2008); Biwot v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir.
2005); Herbert v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 68, 72 (1st Cir. 2003).
70 531 F.3d at 257.
71 Id. at 257-58.
72 Id. at  258.
73 See, e.g., Memorandum from John Morton, supra note 6, at 4. Following a listing of the
positive factors that offices may utilize in making prosecutorial decisions, the June 17 Morton
Memo advises that “[t]his list is not exhaustive and no one factor is determinative.  ICE
officers, agents, and attorneys should always consider prosecutorial discretion on a case-by-
case basis.  The decisions should be based on the totality of the circumstances, with the goal of
conforming to ICE’s enforcement priorities.” Id.
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directives, such as the June 17 Morton Memo, caution that no one factor is
determinative.74  The Morton Memo further identifies the following positive
and negative factors that warrant “particular care and consideration”:
• veterans and members of the U.S. armed forces;
• long-time lawful permanent residents;
• minors and elderly individuals;
• individuals present in the United States since childhood;
• pregnant or nursing women;
• victims of domestic violence, trafficking or other serious crimes;
• individuals who suffer from a serious mental or physical disability;
• individuals with serious health conditions;
• individuals who pose a clear risk to national security;
• serious felons, repeat offenders or individuals with a lengthy criminal
record of any kind;
• known gang members or other individuals who pose a clear danger to
public safety; and
• individuals with an egregious record of immigration violations, in-
cluding those with a record of illegal re-entry and those who have
engaged in immigration fraud.75
At the very least, denials of prosecutorial discretion are based upon
only one factor or fail to take into account those factors that warrant “partic-
ular care and concern,” APA review seems appropriate.
C. Agency Actions that are “Committed to Agency Discretion”
Despite the APA’s strong presumption in favor of judicial review,76 the
APA itself contains an exception to judicial review where “agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law.”77  Scholars historically have wres-
tled with the tension that lies between Section 706 of the APA, which appar-
ently requires a court to set aside agency actions that are found to be
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance
with law,” and the second exception under section 701, which limits judicial
review to the extent that the agency action is “committed to agency discre-
tion by law.”78  Raoul Berger has argued that the “committed to agency
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 190 (1993); see also Abbott Laboratories v. Gard-
ner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) (“[O]nly upon a showing of ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of
a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review.”); Calle-Vujiles
v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 474 (3d Cir. 2003) (“here is a strong presumption that Congress
intends judicial review of administrative action.”).
77 Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 701 (2006).
78 Id. at §§ 701, 706; see John C. Moore, Judicial Review under the APA of Agency Action
Committed to Agency Discretion by Law, 29 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 360 (1972); K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 28: 6 (1984); Raoul Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and
Judicial Review, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 58 (1965); Harvey Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A
Functional Analysis of “Committed to Agency Discretion,” 82 HARV. L. REV. 367, 373 (1968).
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discretion” doctrine does not apply and that the APA instead directs the
courts to review all claims of abuse of discretion.79  To reach this conclusion,
Berger “would in effect read the introductory phrase ‘committed to agency
discretion’ as ‘committed to a reasonably exercised discretion.’” 80  On the
other hand, Harvey Saferstein has argued that the language of the APA, how-
ever confusing, would have to be more definitive to reach a conclusion that
Congress intended to overturn non-reviewability when it passed the APA,
especially when the APA itself contains exceptions to judicial review.81  In
an early but oft-cited federal case from the Second Circuit, Judge Henry
Jacob Friendly narrowed the concept of “abuse of discretion” and then ad-
vanced review for cases that meet the narrow criteria.82  The case law has
developed since the Berger-Saferstein debates, and the Supreme Court has
concluded that the “committed to agency discretion” language precluding
review can function simultaneously with a general standard of judicial re-
view.  Following this decision, the tension among scholars and courts has
shifted to how “committed to agency discretion” should be interpreted or,
put more simply, where the line of review and no review should be drawn.
Below are some of the seminal decisions analyzing the APA’s “commit-
ted to agency discretion” exception.  In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether the petitioners had a right
to judicial review under Section 701 of the APA.83 The petitioners, a group
of private citizens and some local and national conservation organizations,
argued that the Secretary of Transportation had violated two statutes (the
Department of Transportation Act and the Federal-Aid Highway Act) by ap-
proving the construction of a six-lane highway through a 342-acre city park
in Memphis known as Overton Park.84  These statutes prohibited the use of
federal funds to build highways through public parks if a “feasible and pru-
dent” alternative route existed.85  The Court held that the Secretary’s action
was subject to judicial review under the APA and, with respect to the second
exception, determined that the “committed to agency discretion” limitation
applies only in those rare instances when the particular statutes are so broad
that “no law” can be found to apply.86  “Law to apply” may include not
only statutory language, but also regulations, policy statements, and memo-
randa.87  Following the language of the APA, the Court held that the proper
standard of review was whether the action was “‘arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law,’ or if the action
failed to meet statutory, procedural or constitutional requirements.”88
79 Saferstein, supra note 77, at 373 (citing Raoul Berger, supra note 77).
80 Id. (citing Raoul Berger, supra note 77).
81 Id. at 374.
82 See Hang v. INS, 360 F.2d 715, 717-18 (2d Cir. 1966).
83 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
84 Id. at 404-06.
85 Id. at 405.
86 Id. at 410 (internal citation omitted).
87 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 826 (1985).
88 Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 414 (internal citations omitted).
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Adopting this new standard, the Court held that the “committed to agency
discretion” exception did not apply and remanded the case back to the dis-
trict court.
Heckler v. Chaney involved a group of death row inmates challenging
the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) failure to take various enforce-
ment actions in connection with drugs being used for human execution.89
The Supreme Court construed the exception narrowly, suggesting that re-
view is precluded “in those rare instances” where “the statute is drawn so
that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the
agency’s exercise of discretion.”90  The Court found that the FDA’s decision
not to prosecute violations under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA) was unreviewable because such exercises of prosecutorial discre-
tion are “committed to the agency’s discretion.”91  It held that an agency’s
“decision not to enforce often involves a complicated balancing of a number
of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise.”92  The Court also found
that the agency’s refusal to act is “only presumptively unreviewable; the
presumption may be rebutted where the substantive statute has provided
guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers.”93
Heckler is distinguishable from the sorts of cases I believe may be review-
able because Heckler focused largely on the agency refusing to take an en-
forcement action, as opposed to the agency denying prosecutorial discretion
89 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 823-25.
90 Id. at 830.  This passage has been affirmed and cited by the Court in subsequent deci-
sions including, but not limited to, Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191 (1993).  Justice
Thurgood Marshall issued a concurrence, criticizing the majority’s “presumption of un-
reviewability” and detailing the jurisprudence in support of judicial review over prosecutorial
discretion. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 840 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Mar-
shall stated:
And in rejecting on the merits of a claim of improper prosecutorial conduct in [cita-
tion omitted] we clearly laid to rest any notion that prosecutorial discretion is unre-
viewable no matter what the basis is upon which it is exercised: “There is no doubt
that the breadth of discretion that our country’s legal system vests in prosecuting
attorneys carries with it the potential for both individual and institutional abuse.  And
broad though that discretion may be, there is undoubtedly constitutional limits upon
its exercise.
Id. at 846-47 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434
U.S. 357, 365 (1978)).
91 Id. at 837-38.
92 Id. at 831.  The Court further noted that:
[T]he agency must not only assess whether a violation has occurred, but whether
agency resources are best spent on this violation or another, whether the agency is
likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested best
fits the agency’s overall policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has enough re-
sources to undertake the action at all.  An agency generally cannot act against each
technical violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing.
Id.
93 Id. at 832-33.
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and taking an enforcement action.94  The Court took great care in pointing
out this distinction when it stated:
In addition to these administrative concerns, we note that when an
agency refuses to act it generally does not exercise its coercive
power over an individual’s liberty or property rights, and thus does
not infringe upon areas that courts often are called upon to protect.
Similarly, when an agency does act to enforce, that action itself
provides a focus for judicial review, inasmuch as the agency must
have exercised its power in some manner.95
Notably, Heckler has been singled out by the immigration agency as the
basis for shielding immigration decisions involving prosecutorial discretion
from judicial review.96 Such a reading, however, does not account for the
agency’s amassing of standards around prosecutorial discretion over the past
decade, nor does it address situations where the agency diverges from these
standards and acts to enforce the law.  Today, the standards outlined in Over-
ton Park and Heckler support the premise of this Article, that many of the
guidelines identified in directives like the June 17 Morton Memo contain
“more than enough law” under which a federal court could review
prosecutorial decisions that are contrary to the agency’s own guidance.  To
illustrate, the June 17 Morton Memo elucidates nineteen factors that ICE
employees and attorneys should take into account when deciding whether or
not to exercise prosecutorial discretion favorably:
• the agency’s civil immigration enforcement priorities;
• the person’s length of presence in the United States, with particular
consideration given to presence while in lawful status;
• the circumstances of the person’s arrival in the United States and the
manner of his or her entry, particularly if the alien came to the
United States as a young child;
• the person’s pursuit of education in the United States, with particular
consideration given to those who have graduated from a U.S. high
school or have successfully pursued or are pursuing a college or ad-
vanced degree at a legitimate institution of higher education in the
United States;
• whether the person, or the person’s immediate relative, has served in
the U.S. military, reserves, or national guard, with particular consid-
eration given to those who served in combat;
• the person’s criminal history, including arrests, prior convictions or
outstanding arrest warrants;
94 Admittedly, there are some agency decisions that are technically “inactions” that I
would like to see reviewable under the APA, but most of the situations I envision for my
argument involve prosecutorial discretion “denials” that result in the agency taking an en-
forcement action against the individual.
95 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832.
96 See, e.g., Memorandum from Doris Meissner, supra note 5, at 3.
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• the person’s immigration history, including any prior removal, out-
standing order of removal, prior denial of status or evidence of fraud;
• whether the person poses a national security or public safety concern;
• the person’s ties and contributions to the community, including fam-
ily relationships;
• the person’s ties to the home country and conditions in the country;
• the person’s age, with particular consideration given to minors and
the elderly;
• whether the person has a U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse,
child or parent;
• whether the person is the primary caretaker of a person with a mental
or physical disability, minor or seriously ill relative;
• whether the person or the person’s spouse is pregnant or nursing;
• whether the person or the person’s spouse suffers from severe mental
or physical illness;
• whether the person’s nationality renders removal unlikely;
• whether the person is likely to be granted temporary or permanent
status or other relief from removal, including as a relative of a U.S.
citizen or permanent resident;
• whether the person is likely to be granted temporary or permanent
status or other relief from removal, including as an asylum seeker, or
a victim of domestic violence, human trafficking or other crime; and
• whether the person is currently cooperating or has cooperated with
federal, state or local law enforcement authorities, such as ICE, the
U.S. Attorneys or Department of Justice, the Department of Labor, or
National Labor Relations Board, among others.97
The limitations of the outcome in Heckler are also illustrated by the
body of decisions surrounding the review of “affirmances without opinions”
(AWO) by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).  The Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals is the highest administrative appellate body in the Department
of Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).98  In 1999, the
DOJ issued regulations that enable the BIA to issue truncated decisions in
the form of an “affirmance without opinion” for particular cases raised on
appeal.99  The BIA’s authority to issue AWOs was expanded in 2002 by a
regulation issued by former Attorney General John Ashcroft.100
97 Memorandum from John Morton, supra note 6, at 4-5.
98 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Board of Immigration Appeals, JUSTICE.GOV, http://www.justice.
gov/eoir/biainfo.htm (last updated Nov. 2011).
99 64 Fed. Reg. 56135 (Oct. 18, 1999).
100 See 67 Fed. Reg. 54878 (Aug. 26, 2002). 8 C.F.R. § 1003(e)(4) (2012) (“Affirmance
without opinion. (i) The Board member to whom a case is assigned shall affirm the decision of
the Service or the immigration judge, without opinion, if the Board member determines that
the result reached in the decision under review was correct; that any errors in the decision
under review were harmless or nonmaterial; and that
(A) The issues on appeal are squarely controlled by existing Board or federal court
precedent and do not involve the application of precedent to a novel factual situa-
tion; or
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Following the promulgation of the regulations, the federal circuit courts
grappled with whether judicial review was available for decisions in which
an AWO was issued.  In many of these cases, the government relied on
Heckler to argue that the BIA’s decision to streamline a particular case is
committed to agency discretion and was not subject to judicial review.101
Rejecting the government’s position, the First, Third and Ninth Circuits have
found that federal courts have jurisdiction to review AWO procedures in
immigration cases.102  To illustrate, in Haoud v. Ashcroft, the First Circuit
held:
Here, the Board’s own regulation provides more than enough
“law” by which a court could review the Board’s decision to
streamline. As 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4) sets out supra, the Board
cannot affirm an IJ’s decision without opinion if the decision is
incorrect, errors in the decision are not harmless or immaterial, the
issues on appeal are not squarely controlled by Board or federal
court precedent and involve the application of precedent to a novel
fact situation, or the issues raised on appeal are so substantial that
a full written opinion is necessary.103
Federal courts have also considered the standards outlined in Heckler to
analyze whether the decision to “administratively close” an immigration
case is “committed to agency discretion by law.”104  Administrative closure
is not included in the INA or the governing regulations, but rather has been
guided historically by the following passage from Matter of Gutierrez: “Ad-
ministrative closure of a case is used to temporarily remove the case from an
immigration judge’s calendar or from the Board of Immigration Appeal’s
docket. A case may not be administratively closed if opposed by either of
the parties.”105  Significantly, Matter of Gutierrez confused the prosecutorial
role of the DHS attorney and the independent discretion of the immigration
judge by giving DHS unilateral power over the administrative closure deci-
sions.  On January 31, 2012, the BIA issued another important decision,
(B) The factual and legal issues raised on appeal are not so substantial that the case
warrants the issuance of a written opinion in the case.
(ii) If the Board member determines that the decision should be affirmed without opinion, the
Board shall issue an order that reads as follows: ‘The Board affirms, without opinion, the result
of the decision below. The decision below is, therefore, the final agency determination. See 8
§ CFR 1003.1(e)(4) (2012).’ An order affirming without opinion, issued under authority of this
provision, shall not include further explanation or reasoning.  Such an order approves the result
reached in the decision below; it does not necessarily imply approval of all of the reasoning of
that decision, but does signify the Board’s conclusion that any errors in the decision of the
immigration judge or the Service were harmless or nonmaterial.”).
101 See, e.g., Haoud v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 201, 206 (1st Cir. 2003); Smriko v. Ashcroft,
387 F.3d 279, 292 (3d Cir. 2004); Chen v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 2004).
102 See id.
103 Haoud v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d at 206.
104 See, e.g., Haoud, 350 F.3d 201; Smriko, 387 F.3d 279; Chen, 378 F.3d 1081.
105 21 I&N Dec. 479, 480 (BIA 1996), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/
vol21/3286.pdf; see also Matter of Peugnet, 20 I&N Dec. 233 (BIA 1991);  Matter of Munoz-
Santos, 20 I&N Dec. 205, 206 (BIA 1990).
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Matter of Avetisyan, to clarify the bounds of permissible discretion for the
immigration judge and to evaluate the assertion that immigration judges may
“administratively close [removal proceedings], even if a party opposes, if it
is otherwise appropriate.”106  Specifically, the BIA held that:
In determining whether administrative closure of proceedings is
appropriate, an immigration judge or the BIA should weigh all rel-
evant factors, including, but not limited to: (1) the reason adminis-
trative closure is sought; (2) the basis for any opposition to
administrative closure; (3) the likelihood the respondent will suc-
ceed on any petition, application or other action he or she is pursu-
ing outside of removal proceedings; (4) the anticipated duration of
the closure; (5) the responsibility of either party, if any, in contrib-
uting to any current or anticipated delay; and (6) the ultimate out-
come of removal proceedings (for example, termination of the
proceedings or entry of a removal order) when the case is re-
calendared before the Immigration Judge or the appeal is rein-
stated before the BIA.107
In the case of Alcaraz v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the
Ninth Circuit considered whether the BIA erred by failing to administra-
tively close sua sponte their removal proceedings because they were eligible
for “repapering.”108  The petitioners were married, had entered the United
States without inspection in 1989, were both employed, and had a U.S. citi-
zen-daughter.109  Though the directives governing repapering were sub-regu-
latory in that INS and the EOIR issued them in the form of memoranda, the
court found that the petitioners were potentially eligible for repapering and
remanded the cases for further consideration.110  The court highlighted the
legal position that agencies may be required to comply with internal
memoranda.111
The court disagreed with the government’s argument that the court
lacked jurisdiction to review the agency actions because the INS’s repaper-
ing decision was either statutorily precluded by INA § 242(g) or “committed
106 Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688, 690 (BIA 2012), available at http://www.jus-
tice.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/vol25/3740.pdf.
107 Id. at 688.
108 384 F.3d 1150, 1158-62 (9th Cir. 2004).  “Repapering” is a form of a relief because it
enables certain non-citizens to become eligible for removal relief by postponing or “repaper-
ing” the date of their removal proceedings.  The court cited to a series of memoranda issued by
INS and EOIR regarding the procedures by which cases should be administratively closed for
persons eligible for repapering. Id.
109 Id. at 1156.
110 Id. at 1162-63.
111 Id. at 1150 (recognizing that “[t]he legal proposition that agencies may be required to
abide by certain internal policies is well-established”).  For a detailed discussion of case law
regarding agencies’ internal guidelines, see id. For a nice analysis about the role of subregu-
latory guidance in immigration law, see Jill Family, Administrative Law Through the Lens of
Immigration Law, Widener Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-04 (February 22,
2012), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2009436 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.2009436.
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to the agency’s discretion by law” under the APA.112 As to the judicial ex-
emption outlined in section 701(a)(2) of the APA, the court made a reference
to Heckler v. Chaney when noting that the jurisdictional bar “is applicable in
those rare instances where statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a
given case there is no law to apply.”113  The court found, however, that the
discretion by the agency had been legally prescribed by the repapering mem-
oranda and guidance issued by the INS, and for this reason the statute was
not drawn in such broad terms that there was “no law to apply.”114  The
court affirmed that the “law” in Heckler’s “no law to apply” corresponds
not only to the statute but also to policy memoranda and guides from the
agency.115
Indeed, the standards outlined in the June 17 Morton Memo are more
developed than many of the documents that judges have previously con-
cluded contain “more than enough law” to warrant APA review.  Together,
the intent of the APA to create a judicial review scheme by which agency
actions may be “checked,” the jurisprudence in support of judicial review
over agency action, and the body of circuit case law that interprets narrowly
“committed to agency discretion” all show that federal courts should have
jurisdiction to review select prosecutorial discretion decisions under the
APA.116
Distinguishable from this jurisprudence and the ample agency guidance
on prosecutorial discretion are a few notable decisions by the Supreme Court
that have found that an action was “committed to agency discretion under
law,” and therefore precluded APA review. Webster v. Doe involved an em-
112 Id. at 1160-61.
113 Id. at 1161 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985)).
114 Id. The court also cites to Mendez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 865, 868 (9th Cir.
2003) (stating that the “no law to apply” rule is applicable where there are “no statutes,
regulations, established agency policies or judicial decisions that provide a meaningful stan-
dard against which to assess” the agency’s actions).
115 Id. Note that the Ninth Circuit came down with a different position in Diaz-Covarru-
bias v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1114, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that judicial review is precluded
in general administrative closure decisions because courts have no legal standard to apply).  In
Garza-Moreno v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 239, 242 (6th Cir. 2007), the court also found that it had
jurisdiction to review a denial of administrative closure by the BIA.  The court reasoned:
The decision to administratively close a case is, in this context, not distinguishable
from a continuance.  Following Abu-Khaliel, we hold that § 1252 does not strip us
of jurisdiction to review the denial of an administrative closure.  Having jurisdiction,
we review for abuse of discretion, disturbing the BIA’s decision only if the refusal to
administratively close the case “was made without a rational explanation, inexplica-
bly departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such as
invidious discrimination.”
Id. (citing Abu-Khaliel v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 627, 630-31 (6th Cir. 2006)). The court did not
discuss the application of Heckler v. Chaney and the APA exemption for decisions “committed
to agency discretion.”
116 Some of the scenarios identified above involve the review of adjudicatory decisions by
immigration judges as opposed to the prosecutorial judgments of DHS officers and attorneys.
This distinction, however, is largely irrelevant to this Article’s examination of whether federal
judges have “enough law” against which to analyze and review prosecutorial discretion deci-
sions for abuse, arbitrariness or whatever the standard of review may be.
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ployee terminated under a provision of the National Security Act of 1947
(NSA) allowing the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director, “in his dis-
cretion,” to terminate any employee “whenever he shall deem such termina-
tion necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States.”117  The
employee was a covert electronics technician and was terminated from his
employment after voluntarily informing the CIA that he was a homosex-
ual.118  The employee (respondent) filed a lawsuit in the federal district court
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief alleging violations under the APA
and the U.S. Constitution.119  Deciding against the fired employee, the Court
found that the decision by the CIA was “committed to agency discretion”
because the NSA provision was drawn in such broad terms that it provided
no meaningful standard for reviewing the reasons for termination.120 For
comparison, the language contained in the NSA statute allowing for termina-
tion of an employee “whenever [the Director] shall deem such termination
necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States” stands in marked
contrast to the language of the June 17 Morton Memo, which expressly lays
out numerous factors that should be considered when making prosecutorial
discretion decisions.
Lincoln v. Vigil revolved around the termination of a bundle of services
known as the “Indian Children’s Program,” which were provided by the
Indian Health Service, an arm of the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices.121  The issue in Lincoln was whether the Indian Health Service’s deci-
sion to terminate the children’s program was reviewable under the APA.122
Reasoning that the children’s program was financed by a Congressional
“lump-sum appropriation,” as opposed to legally binding restrictions as to
how the sum should be spent, the Court found that the decision was “com-
mitted to agency discretion by law” and therefore immune from judicial
review under section 701(a)(2) of the APA.123
D. Examining Preclusions to Judicial Review within the Immigration
and Nationality Act
The APA restricts judicial review not only for decisions that are “com-
mitted to the agency’s discretion,” but also in situations where “statutes pre-
clude judicial review.”124  As such, it is important to examine the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) for indications that prosecutorial dis-
cretion decisions by the immigration agency are foreclosed from judicial
review.
117 486 U.S. 592, 594 (1988) (quoting National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 403(c)).
118 Id. at 594-95
119 Id. at 596.
120 Id. at 599-601.
121 508 U.S. 182, 185 (1993).
122 Id. at 189.
123 Id. at 192-93.
124 Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 701 (2006).
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A plain reading of the APA would suggest that if a section of the INA
precludes judicial review for a particular action, then such actions are unre-
viewable under the APA as well.  In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immi-
gration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA).125  This
legislation amended the INA and modified the statutory scheme for judicial
review in immigration matters.  Within this scheme, IIRAIRA included a
provision governing judicial review over specific prosecutorial discretion
decisions; INA § 242(g) expressly states that no court has “jurisdiction to
hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the deci-
sion . . . to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases or execute removal
orders against any alien under this Act.”126
In Reno v. ADC, the Supreme Court interpreted INA § 242(g) to mean
that prosecutorial discretion decisions are immune from judicial review.127
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia clarified that the bar to judicial re-
view is limited to the three acts included in the statute –“to commence pro-
ceedings, adjudicate cases or execute removal orders”– and made a specific
reference to the then-regular practice of “deferred action.”128
Similarly, the Alcaraz court (discussed above) considered the statutory
prohibitions outlined in INA § 242(g) and clarified in Reno to conclude:
125 8 U.S.C.A. § 1103 (2008).
126 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 242(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006).
127 525 U.S. 471, 492 (1999).  The facts involved a group of noncitizens who believe they
were selectively charged with violating the immigration laws based on their affiliation with a
politically unpopular group.  The respondents argued that the doctrine of constitutional doubt
required the Court to interpret section 242(g) to permit the immediate review of selective
enforcement claims because of the potential “chilling effect” on First Amendment rights.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia disagreed with the respondents and concluded that “an
alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional right to assert selective enforcement as a
defense against his deportation.” Id. at 488. Though Justice Scalia read section 242(g) to pre-
clude review of prosecutorial discretion decisions involving the commencement of removal
proceedings, adjudication of cases, and execution of removal orders, he stated that “[t]o re-
solve the present controversy, we need not rule out the possibility of a rare case in which the
alleged basis of discrimination is so outrageous that the foregoing considerations can be over-
come.” Id. at 491.
128 Id. at 484.  Specifically, the Court stated:
The provision applies only to three discrete actions that the Attorney General may
take: her “decision or action” to “commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or exe-
cute removal orders.” (Emphasis added.) There are of course many other decisions
or actions that may be part of the deportation process—such as the decisions to open
an investigation, to surveil the suspected violator, to reschedule the deportation hear-
ing, to include various provisions in the final order that is the product of the adjudi-
cation, and to refuse reconsideration of that order. It is implausible that the mention
of three discrete events along the road to deportation was a shorthand way of refer-
ring to all claims arising from deportation proceedings.
Id. at 482. Historically “deferred action” was a term used to describe any action the agency
took to refrain from enforcement of the immigration laws.  The concept has evolved over the
years, however; currently, deferred action is understood as one among several possible deci-
sions that involve prosecutorial discretion by the immigration agency.  Deferred action is
among the more generous remedies insofar as individuals granted deferred action are eligible
to apply for work authorization and, moreover, are considered to be in a status that will be
considered “lawful” for purposes of calculating unlawful presence.  For a fuller study on de-
ferred action, see Wadhia, Sharing Secrets, supra note 4.
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Under [INA § 242](g), we lack jurisdiction to consider “to hear
any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the
decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceed-
ings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders . . . .” [INA
§ 242](g) (emphasis added).  While the second step in the repaper-
ing process involves a decision to commence (or “reinitiate”) pro-
ceedings, the first step, the administrative closure of proceedings,
does not implicate [INA § 242](g).  The Alcarazes’ repapering
claim only raises the issue of administrative closure. Therefore, we
are not barred from hearing this claim by [INA § 242](g).129
Applying the narrow reading of section 242(g) to the full range of ac-
tions that encompass prosecutorial discretion supports the assertion that de-
cisions lying outside the three acts listed in 242(g) may be subject to APA
review.  The analysis below demonstrates that in spite of the statutory
preclusions of review over a few discrete decisions involving prosecutorial
discretion, there are a number of decisions that remain subject to APA re-
view.  The June 17 Morton Memo describes the following discretionary en-
forcement decisions to illustrate the scope of prosecutorial discretion, many
of which fall outside the actions outlined in 242(g):
• deciding to issue or cancel a notice of detainer;
• deciding to issue, reissue, serve, file or cancel a Notice to Appear
(NTA);
• focusing enforcement resources on particular administrative viola-
tions or conduct;
• deciding whom to stop, question or arrest for an administrative
violation;
• deciding whom to detain or to release on bond, supervision, personal
recognizance or other condition;
• seeking expedited removal or other forms of removal by means other
than a formal removal proceeding in immigration court;
• settling or dismissing a proceeding;
• granting deferred action, granting parole or staying a final order of
removal;
• agreeing to voluntary departure, the withdrawal of an application for
admission, or other action in lieu of obtaining a formal order of
removal;
• pursuing an appeal;
• executing a removal order; and
• responding to or joining in a motion to reopen removal proceedings
and to consider joining in a motion to grant relief or a benefit.130
129 Alcaraz v. INS, 384 F.3d 1150, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2004).
130 Memorandum from John Morton, supra note 6, at 2-3. See also Wadhia, The Morton
Memo and Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 38.
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A notable fact, but not necessarily critical to the analysis, is that regula-
tions govern some of the examples furnished by the Morton Memo, such as
the cancellation of a Notice to Appear and motions to dismiss removal pro-
ceedings.131  The BIA has further distinguished the scope of DHS’s
prosecutorial authority before the initiation of removal proceedings and sim-
ilar decisions made after such proceedings.132
131 See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 239.2 (2003). This statute provides that: (“Any officer authorized
by § 239.1(a) to issue a notice to appear may cancel such notice prior to jurisdiction vesting
with the immigration judge pursuant to § 3.14 of this chapter provided the officer is satisfied
that:
(a) Any officer authorized by § 251.1(a) to issue a notice to appear may cancel such
notice prior to jurisdiction vesting with the immigration judge pursuant to § 3.14 of
this chapter provided the officer is satisfied that:
(1) The respondent is a national of the United States;
(2) The respondent is not deportable or inadmissible under immigration laws;
(3) The respondent is deceased;
(4) The respondent is not in the United States;
(5) The notice was issued for the respondent’s failure to file a timely petition as
required by section 216(c) of the Act, but his or her failure to file a timely
petition was excused in accordance with section 216(d)(2)(B) of the Act;
(6) The notice to appear was improvidently issued; or
(7) Circumstances of the case have changed after the notice to appear was is-
sued to such an extent that continuation is no longer in the best interest of the
government . . .
(c) Motion to dismiss. After commencement of proceedings pursuant to 8 CFR
1003.14, ICE counsel, or any officer enumerated in paragraph (a) of this section,
may move for dismissal of the matter on the grounds set out under paragraph (a) of
this section.
(d) Motion for remand. After commencement of the hearing, ICE counsel or any
officer enumerated in paragraph (a) of this section may move for remand of the
matter to district jurisdiction on the ground that the foreign relations of the United
States are involved and require further consideration.”
132 See, e.g., Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688, 694 (BIA 2012), available at http://
www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/vol25/3740.pdf; Matter of GNC, 22 I&N Dec. 281, 284 (BIA
1998), available at www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/vol22/3366.pdf.  In Matter of GNC, the
Board held:
We recognize that the decision to institute deportation proceedings involves the exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion and is not a decision which the Immigration Judge or
the Board may review. Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 505 (BIA
1980).  Likewise, a service officer authorized to issue a Notice to Appear has com-
plete power to cancel such notice prior to jurisdiction vesting with the Immigration
Judge. 8 C.F.R. § 239.2(a).  However, after commencement of proceedings in the
Immigration Court, Service counsel may move for dismissal of the matter on the
grounds set out [in] this section.  8 C.F.R. § 239.2(c).  This language marks a clear
boundary between the time prior to commencement of proceedings, where a Service
officer has decisive power to cancel proceedings, and the time following commence-
ment, where the Service officer merely has the privilege to move for dismissal of
proceedings.  By this distinction, the regulation presumably contemplates not just the
automatic grant of a motion to terminate, but an informed adjudication by the Immi-
gration Judge or this Board based on an evaluation of the factors underlying the
Service’s motion. See Matter of Vizcarra-Delgadillo, 13 I&N Dec. 51, 54 (BIA
1968); see also Matter of Wong, 13 I&N Dec. 701, 703 (BIA 1971) (stating that
Service officials may move the Immigration Judge for termination of proceedings as
a matter of prosecutive discretion); cf. Matter of Andrade, 14 I&N Dec. 651, 652
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Beyond the scope of this section is INA § 242(a)(2)(B), which pre-
cludes judicial review of many of the formal immigration decisions involv-
ing a discretionary component, such as the criminal waiver of
inadmissibility, cancellation of removal, adjustment of status and “any other
decision or action . . . specified under this title to be in the discretion of the
Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security, other than the
granting of relief under section 208(a).”133  These decisions involve formal
immigration remedies that include a discretionary component and are, de-
pending on the jurisdiction, adjudicated by DHS or EOIR. This situation
differs from prosecutorial discretion, which is an action that is informal,
cabined in the jurisdiction of the DHS, and located outside the subchapter
INA § 242(a)(2)(B).134
(BIA 1974) (finding that the Service motion to terminate, if granted, would benefit
the alien, and assuming there would be no opposition from the alien’s attorney).
22 I&N Dec. 281, 284 (BIA 1998), available at www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/vol22/3366.
pdf. Also relevant to the prosecutorial decisions governed by regulation is the BIA standard
that regulatory violations can invalidate removal proceedings if the procedure or regulation
benefits the noncitizen and the violation of the regulation prejudiced the noncitizen.  Matter of
Hernandez, 21 I&N Dec. 224, 228 (BIA 1996), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/
intdec/vol21/3265.pdf.
133 INA § 242(a)(2)(B). 8 U.S.C. §  1252 (2006) .
134 Another section worthy of analysis is INA § 242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006).
This section was enacted by Congress in 2005 as part of the REAL ID Act and provides an
exception to many of the statute’s judicial review bars: “Nothing in subparagraph (B) or (C), or
in any other provision of this Act (other than this section) which limits or eliminates judicial
review, shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law
raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with
this section.”  INA § 242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006).
While this provision has expanded review for certain claims previously barred from judicial
review, such as crime-related removals, it is unlikely that INA § 242(a)(2)(D) created a new
judicial review forum for prosecutorial discretion decisions.  First, the plain language of the
statute cabins the exception to any provision of the INA “other than this section,” which
suggests that the exception does not override other subsections in § 242 that bar judicial re-
view.  INA § 242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006). Second, the language limits claims based
on constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a “petition for review,” a document
traditionally filed after the noncitizen has been ordered removed. INA § 242(b), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252 (2006). By contrast, the actions barred by INA § 242(g) are broader than the review
available upon a filing of a petition to review. INA § 242(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006).
One normative question and counterargument to my proposal is whether Congress would have
intended to support judicial review of decisions involving prosecutorial discretion when it
went out of its way to preclude it for more formal discretionary forms of relief from removal.
I am not particularly persuaded by the argument, given the ordinary rules of statutory construc-
tion, see, e.g., Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827 (2010), and the reasonable case that without
APA review prosecutorial discretion decisions are immune from review before any administra-
tive or judicial form.  Contrast this with INA § 242(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006), where
the decisions themselves are legally reviewable by an immigration judge and the Board of
Immigration Appeals.
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IV. DESIGNING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION REVIEW
AND WHY IT MATTERS
[T]he case for judicial review does not rest on charity.  It rests on procedu-
ral justice.  When the individual interests at stake are potentially large as
they are in immigration disputes, tailoring the precise contours of procedu-
ral justice to the nationality of the litigant is a troubling notion. Pinning the
availability of the litigant is more troubling still.  It is a notion that a society
built on a rule of law and on the egalitarian freedom from arbitrary govern-
ment interference should forcefully disavow.135
The literature on the role of judicial review over formal immigration
decisions is illuminating, and also relevant to understanding the normative
benefits of federal court review over prosecutorial discretion decisions.136
These benefits of judicial review are well summarized by immigration
scholar Stephen H. Legomsky:
The judicial attributes discussed up to this point, independence and
generalist legal knowledge, effectively improve the quality of the
decisions that actually are reviewed in court.  But judicial review
also serves another function, one that operates even in cases that
never reach court.  The mere possibility that an alien will seek ju-
dicial review of an asylum decision encourages the various admin-
istrative authorities to study the case carefully and to state their
reasoning intelligibly . . . .  As a final benefit, judicial review in
federal court provides a structure for the gradual development of
legal doctrine.137
Lenni Benson argues that judicial review may have its “own efficiency
value” to the extent that federal courts clarify the meaning of vague statu-
tory terms such as the definition of “aggravated felony.”138  Moreover, Ben-
son describes how federal circuit review over immigration cases provide
greater clarity in the changing strategies of the agency prosecutors,
the procedural behaviors of the IJs, and the institutional reforms of
the administrative process.  When courts refine the interpretive
135 Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration
and Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1632 (2000).
136 See, e.g., id.; Lenni B. Benson, You Can’t Get There from Here: Managing Judicial
Review of Immigration Cases, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 405 (2007) [hereinafter You Can’t Get
There]; Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of
Immigration Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411 (1997) [hereinafter Back to the Future];
Nancy Morawetz, Back to Back to the Future? Lessons Learned from Litigation over the 1996
Restrictions on Judicial Review, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 113 (2006-2007); Stephen H. Legom-
sky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 369 (2006); Wadhia, The
Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 4.
137 Legomsky, Political Asylum, supra note 28, at 1210-11; see also, Legomsky, Fear and
Loathing, supra note 27, at 1628; Wadhia, Sharing Secrets, supra note 4, at 1631.
138 Benson, You Can’t Get There, supra note 135, at 431.
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tools for applying statutes and implementing procedures, they pro-
vide guidance to the agency prosecutors and to the administrative
officials.  This conversation between the courts and the agencies
can help answer the open questions and thus help the system oper-
ate more effectively.139
Distinguishing the journey “from here to there,” she defines there as a
“sound, effective, efficient and manageable method of judicial review.”140
But the here of judicial review cannot be ignored and, according to
Benson, represents the “expensive, time-consuming and exponentially ex-
panding reservoir of cases that is our current system.”141  Beyond the mone-
tary costs associated with judicial review is a concern about empowering
appointed federal judges with limited immigration expertise to override the
decisions made by experts who specialize in immigration.142  On the other
hand, Legomsky has argued that federal courts have the benefit of reviewing
the evidence and decisions made by the “expert” immigration agent and
have the training to provide legally sound opinions.143  Moreover, there is the
concern that noncitizens utilize judicial review in order to delay their depor-
tation.144  However, without specific data about the motivations by nonci-
tizens, any possible “intent to delay deportation” is merely speculative.  It is
plausible that most noncitizens choose judicial review in order to exercise a
substantive or procedural right under the law.  Arguably, cases reversed by
the federal courts or remanded to the BIA would indicate that review is a
means of achieving justice or a fair result, not an easy delay tactic.  Legom-
sky also points to uniformity as a cost of judicial review, meaning that
judges can rule differently on cases that present similar facts and, as a conse-
quence, create inequality.145
Judicial review can also have negative consequences on the administra-
tor, especially when the challenge is based on an internal guidance or “sub-
regulatory” guidance as opposed to a rule specified in the statute or
regulations.  Immigration scholar and former INS General Counsel David
Martin argues that pushing for enhanced judicial review over subregulatory
139 Id. at 432.
140 Id. at 410.
141 Id.
142 See, e.g., Legomsky, Fear and Loathing, supra note 27, at 1628.
143 Id. at 1629.
144 See, e.g., Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole, supra note 28; Legomsky, Fear and
Loathing, supra note 27, at 1630.
145 Legomsky, Fear and Loathing, supra note 27, at 1630.  I am less persuaded that uni-
formity is a real problem when discussing review over prosecutorial discretion decisions, in
part because the review I envision is founded on arbitrary decisions or abuse of discretion by
the agency.  A sampling of recent prosecutorial discretion decisions illustrates a lack of consis-
tency from one region to the next, and further suggests that a review function over these
decisions would only enhance uniformity. See, e.g., AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSO-
CIATION AND THE AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL LEGAL ACTION CENTER, HOLDING DHS
ACCOUNTABLE ON PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION (Nov. 2011), available at http://www.aila.org/
content/default.aspx?bc=6755—25667—37615.
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guidance in immigration matters may cause a reduction of such guidance.
As described in an informal e-communication by Martin:
Judicial review will inevitably reduce transparency by discourag-
ing the promulgation and publication of such guidance.  From my
perspective as a former central office government lawyer, it’s usu-
ally good management and good administration to publish careful
guidance . . . .  But if the price (from the agency’s perspective) of
written guidance is immediate or at least expanded exposure to
judicial review, then the agency will cut back on the issuance of
written guidance. Much more will be left to case-by-case decisions
by individual adjudicators, which can simply obscure from view
the important considerations or de facto policies . . . .  We don’t
always have good administrators, of course, but then we don’t al-
ways have good judges.  It’s important to structure reforms in a
way that doesn’t make life overly burdensome or inflexible (or im-
possible) for those who are good administrators and who try to
change course or improve administration from the inside.146
Professor Martin raises a good point about the negative impact that ex-
posure to judicial review can have on an agency’s future policymaking.  In-
deed, I too would be troubled by a situation where the fear of judicial review
causes the agency to repeal its most substantial policies and replace them
with something broad, like the statute at issue in Webster v. Doe, which
allowed for termination of a CIA employee “whenever [the Director] shall
deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United
States.”147  I am not persuaded, however, that an agency’s decision should be
insulated from this kind of review in this case because of the possibility for
less clear guidance in the future.  As described in more detail below, it may
also be the case that the prospect for court review can prompt the administra-
tor to follow its guidance more carefully.  Moreover, the focus of this Article
is on the body of guidance the agency has actually produced around
prosecutorial discretion and the possibility that judicial review is appropriate
when such guidance is ignored or abused.  The June 17 Morton Memo was
released with great public fanfare, reaffirmed as the “cornerstone” guidance
in subsequent policies issued by the agency, and raised in several public
meetings with advocates and attorneys.  Even if one accepts that “ordinary”
internal guidance should be shielded from judicial review, the June 17 Mor-
ton Memo was no ordinary policy.
Today, prosecutorial discretion decisions are made each and every day
without publicly available information about the facts behind cases ap-
proved, data about cases denied, or concern for the human implications in a
regime where cases involving relevant humanitarian factors are denied with
146 Posting of David Martin, dam3r@virginia.edu, to Immigration Law Professors List
Serve, immprof@lists.ucla.edu (Feb. 16, 2012, 3:06 PM) (on file with author).
147 Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 594 (1988).
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no vehicle for review.  To the extent that many cases in which prosecutorial
discretion is exercised involve situations where no formal relief is available
under immigration law, the denial of prosecutorial discretion often leads to a
noncitizen’s deportation or “removal,” which in turn has been equated to
“banishment” and “exile.”148  In addition to the hardships faced by a nonci-
tizen removed from the United States are potential hardships to the family or
community she leaves behind in the United States or forcibly removes to her
country of removal.  Furthermore, absent a waiver, a removal order prevents
the noncitizen from returning to the United States or applying for formal
immigration benefits or relief from removal for a minimum of five years,
and, in some cases, forever.149
The policy and politics brought by the stalemate in Congress and sym-
pathetic immigration cases involving desperate individuals who would ordi-
narily be protected through legislative reform, but instead take the risk to
submit themselves to the DHS and apply for prosecutorial discretion slightly
improved transparency around prosecutorial discretion.  But the historic lack
of transparency in prosecutorial discretion, reports of inconsistent applica-
tion of such discretion from one region of the United States to the next, and
the lack of incentive on the part of officers to exercise prosecutorial discre-
tion in a judicious matter cannot be ignored.150  In this way, the very prospect
of judicial review can serve as an important incentive for strengthening the
quality of a DHS officer’s decision-making and thereby reduce the need for
judicial review.  Along these lines, the standard proposed in this Article is
set high and limited to only certain decisions that are “arbitrary, capricious
and an abuse of discretion.”  The standard for review could be “abuse of
discretion” and, echoing the Second Circuit, could be articulated as encom-
passing decisions that were “made without a rational explanation, inexplica-
bly departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis
such as an invidious discrimination against a particular race or group.”151
The importance of federal court review is not limited to a favorable
outcome for the noncitizen; such review also assures that noncitizens denied
prosecutorial discretion are given their “day in court.”  The efforts DHS has
148 See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1484 (2010) (“When attorneys know
that their clients face possible exile from this country and separation from their families, they
should not be encouraged to say nothing at all.”); Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391
(1947) (“Deportation can be the equivalent of banishment or exile.”).  Notably, in a move
somewhat distinguishable from the past, and starting in November 2011, ICE appears to have
exercised prosecutorial discretion favorably (or offered to do so) in more cases in which the
respondent appears to be eligible for relief from removal. See, e.g., E-mail from Mary Kenney
to author (Apr. 3, 2012) (on file with author).
149 INA § 212(a)(9)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2006).
150 Wadhia, Sharing Secrets, supra note 4; Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion,
supra note 4, at 293; Wadhia, Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Agencies, supra note
10;  Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Immigration Prosecutor and the Judge: Examining the
Role of the Judiciary in Prosecutorial Discretion Decisions (Apr. 3, 2012), Penn State Law
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2-2012, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2033803 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2033803.
151 Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 360 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir.
1966).
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made to ensure that prosecutorial discretion is exercised properly on the
front end must be matched by a review process to protect individuals and
families who present compelling equities.152  However, the opportunity for
federal court review may itself expand the agency’s desire to follow its own
guidance on prosecutorial discretion and re-consider cases in which
prosecutorial discretion was denied.153
As an alternative to a judicial review scheme, DHS should consider an
administrative review process outside of USCIS, CBP or ICE.  The Office of
the Secretary could create an office responsible for reviewing petitions by
noncitizens denied prosecutorial discretion who present evidence that the
various DHS memoranda on prosecutorial discretion were ignored or misap-
plied.154  The review process could begin as a pilot, rely on electronic filings,
and result in a body of published decisions.  Published decisions can im-
prove transparency about the prosecutorial discretion program and, among
other benefits, enable noncitizens who proceed through the immigration pro-
cess without counsel to understand the contours of prosecutorial discretion
and the application process.155
Since the authority of prosecutorial discretion rests with the DHS, and
not with the immigration adjudicators at EOIR, the proposed judicial or ad-
ministrative review schemes outlined above should be limited to the actions
of the DHS officials exercising discretion, as opposed to the ultimate out-
come by the immigration judge or BIA.  Certainly, any form of review
would increase costs to the U.S. government in the form of training, staff
and related resources.  On the other hand, some costs could be recovered by
operating a pilot review program in one or two locations to assess costs.  The
152 As a practical matter, it is difficult to imagine how such a claim would prevail without
a substantial administrative record or robust “discovery” procedure whereby respondents
could access the documents and paperwork utilized by an officer in rendering a prosecutorial
decision, which in itself presumes that the officer has documented the rationale and details
behind such a decision.  Presumably, DHS can improve its recordkeeping on prosecutorial
discretion decisions.  For a more detailed analysis, see Wadhia, Sharing Secrets, supra note 4;
Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 4; Wadhia, Prosecutorial Discretion
in Immigration Agencies, supra note 10.  An important and related doctrine is the Chenery
doctrine, which states:
[A] reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an adminis-
trative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action
solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.  If those grounds are inadequate or
improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting
what it considers to be a more adequate or proper basis.  To do so would propel the
court into the domain which Congress has set aside exclusively for the administra-
tive agency.
SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947); see also SEC v. Chenery Corp.
(Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943).
153 See Legomsky, Political Asylum, supra note 28, at 1209-12; Legomsky, Fear and
Loathing, supra note 27, at 1615; Wadhia, Sharing Secrets, supra note 4.
154 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/
xabout/structure/office-of-the-secretary.shtm (last visited July 19, 2012).
155 For a similar argument in favor of published decisions in deferred action cases, see
Wadhia, Sharing Secrets, supra note 4.
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feasibility of such a pilot is illustrated by similar pilots created by DHS in
connection with a prosecutorial discretion review of cases pending removal
in select immigration courts.156  Moreover, such review could be accompa-
nied by a form and related application fee that may be waived only in cases
where an applicant is unable to afford such fees.
Beyond judicial review, federal judges can contribute in meaningful
ways to the immigration agency’s use of prosecutorial discretion.  Notably,
on February 6, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit pub-
lished five cases that ordered the DOJ to “advise the court by March 19,
2012, whether the government intends to exercise prosecutorial discretion in
[these cases] and, if so, the effect, if any, of the exercise of such discretion
on any action to be taken by this court with regard to [these cases.].”157  The
cases at issue involved a noncitizen filing a petition for rehearing or panel
rehearing, and the facts of the cases revealed certain salient factors such as
the existence of U.S. citizen children living in the United States, a lack of
any criminal history, and a long-term presence in the United States.
Rather than review prosecutorial discretion, the Orders by the Ninth
Circuit request that the government review the cases in light of the June 17
Morton Memo and its implementing guidance and return to the court with a
decision on prosecutorial discretion.  Notably, in all five cases, Judge
O’Scannlain argued in dissent that the aforementioned memo was “internal
guidance,” that the judicial branch has limited review over prosecutorial dis-
cretion, and that the judiciary lacked authority to demand “a preemptive
peek into whether and when (and no doubt, before long, why) the executive
branch will exercise such discretion.”158
Another example of judges weighing in on the immigration agency’s
prosecutorial discretion guidance in judicial opinions was in the months fol-
lowing the White House’s “announcement” that DOJ and DHS would be
reviewing pending immigration cases for possible administrative closure
under the prosecutorial discretion doctrine. Chief Judge McKee issued an
important concurrence for the Third Circuit Court of Appeals about
prosecutorial discretion.159  The case involved a highly educated software en-
gineer from India who was sponsored for a green card based on a petition
from a U.S. employer but was nevertheless deemed to be subject to the im-
migration law’s ten-year unlawful presence bar because of a visa overstay.160
156 See, e.g., IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, NEXT STEPS IN THE IMPLEMEN-
TATION OF THE PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION MEMORANDUM AND THE AUGUST 18TH AN-
NOUNCEMENT ON IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES, available at http://www.ice.gov/
doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/pros-discretion-next-steps.pdf (last visited July 19, 2012).
157 See Mata-Fasardo v. Holder, 668 F.3d 675, 676 (9th Cir. 2012); Pocasangre v. Holder,
668 F.3d 674, 675 (9th Cir. 2012); Jex v. Holder, 668 F.3d 673, 673-74 (9th Cir. 2012); San
Agustin v. Holder, 668 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2012); Rodriguez v. Holder, 668 F.3d 670, 671 (9th
Cir. 2012).
158 See supra note 156.
159 See Cheruku v. Attorney General of the United States, 662 F.3d 198, 209 (3d Cir.
2011) (McKee, J., concurring).
160 Id. at 200-01.
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While the case itself was rejected under Chevron deference to the BIA’s
position that pending adjustment applicants who leave the United States and
attempt to re-enter on “advance parole” are nevertheless subject to the un-
lawful presence bars, Judge McKee offered the following commentary:
I can only hope that Cheruku will be afforded such review and that
the result will be favorable to her.  My optimism in that regard is
buttressed by a memorandum issued by U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement proving guidance to “ICE” law enforce-
ment personnel and attorneys for the exercise of discretion in re-
moving aliens. . . . Some of the discretionary factors that ICE will
consider include the person’s criminal history or lack thereof,
whether the person is otherwise likely to be granted temporary or
permanent status or other relief from removal, and the person’s
length of presence in the United States.  Although it is certainly
not our place to tell an administrative agency how to apply its
policies, I do note that it appears that Cheruku would qualify for a
favorable exercise of discretion under the new policy given her
lack of criminal background, her employer’s desire that she con-
tinue working as a software engineer, and her residence in the
United States for the last 16 years.161
Judge McKee indeed has “enough law” by which to review how DHS
applies its prosecutorial policies to people like Cheruku, but, leaving that
point aside, the case itself should inspire federal judges to take positions on
the DHS’ use of prosecutorial discretion and question cases that are taking
up federal court resources by landing in court after a removal order is issued
by the agency.  Moreover, Judge McKee’s commentary should motivate the
DHS to consider the importance of review and ensure that its officers follow
the “should” directive embedded in its own prosecutorial discretion
guidance.
V. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: DEFERRED ACTION
FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS
This Article was completed in June 2012. Subsequently, on June 15,
2012, the Department of Homeland Security issued a memorandum in tan-
dem with an announcement from the White House that allows certain young
people living in the United States without legal status to re-
ceive prosecutorial discretion in the form of “deferred action.”162  Formally
known as  “Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals” or “DACA,” the pro-
161 Id. at 211 (McKee, J., concurring).
162 Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland Security, on Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals who Came to the United States as Chil-
dren (June 15, 2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecu
torial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf; see also, Shoba Sivaprasad
Wadhia, Deferred Action in Immigration Law: The Next Generation, IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG
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gram allows individuals who meet the following criteria to affirmatively ap-
ply with USCIS:
1. Were under the age of 31 as of June 15, 2012;
2. Came to the United States before the age of 16;
3. Have continuously resided in the U.S. since June 15, 2007, up to
the present time;
4. Were physically present in the U.S. on June 15, 2012, and at the
time of applying for deferred action;
5. Entered without inspection before June 15, 2012, or lawful immi-
gration status expired as of June 15, 2012;
6. Are currently in school, have graduated or obtained a certificate of
completion from high school, have obtained a general education
development (GED) certificate, or are an honorably discharged vet-
eran of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the United States;
7. Have not been convicted of a felony, significant misdemeanor,
three or more other misdemeanors, and do not otherwise pose a
threat to national security or public safety.163
DACA has been heralded by immigration advocates as an important
(but temporary) remedy, after young people turned out in the thousands to
reveal their undocumented status and showcase their intellectual promise,
and also pressured the White House and Obama Administration to exercise
prosecutorial discretion favorably towards the same.164  Since the program
was implemented on August 15, the private bar, law school clinics, and not-
for-profit organizations have mobilized in dramatic ways to serve the hun-
dreds of thousands of individuals who may be eligible for DACA.165  At the
same time, DACA has been criticized by select members of Congress, some
ICE officials, and the former advisor to Attorney General John Ashcroft
(June 28, 2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2012/06/deferred-action-in-im-
migration-law-the-next-generation-by-.html.
163 One exception to the general policy of applying with USCIS pertains to those individu-
als who are in immigration detention. See Frequently Asked Questions, UNITED STATES CITI-
ZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c
2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=3a4dbc4b04499310VgnVCM100000082ca60aRC
RD&vgnextchannel=3a4dbc4b04499310VgnVCM1v00000082ca60aRCRD (last visited Oct.
22, 2012).
164 See, e.g., UNITED WE DREAM, http://unitedwedream.org/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2012);
DREAM ACTIVIST, UNDOCUMENTED YOUTH ACTION AND RESOURCE NETWORK, http://www.
dreamactivist.org/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2012); Jose Antonio Vargas, Not Legal Not Leaving,
TIME MAGAZINE (June 25, 2012), available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/
0,9171,2117243,00.html.
165 See, e.g., AILA Resources on Deferred Action, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS AS-
SOCIATION, http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=40291 (last visited Oct. 13, 2012);
Dreamer Resource Hub, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER, http://www.immigrantjus-
tice.org/DREAMers#Eligibility (last visited Oct. 13, 2012); DREAMer Resources, NORTHWEST
IMMIGRANT RIGHTS PROJECT, http://www.nwirp.org/resources/dreamer (last visited Oct. 13,
2012); FAQ: Deferred Action for Certain Immigrant Youth, NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW
CENTER, http://www.nilc.org/FAQdeferredactionyouth.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2012); About
Deferred Action, NYC MAYOR’S OFFICE OF IMMIGRANT AFFAIRS, http://www.nyc.gov/html/
imm/html/deferred/about-deffered.shtml (last visited Oct. 13, 2012).
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(now Secretary of State for Kansas) as an unlawful seizure of legislative
power.166  Building on this criticism is a constitutional challenge by law
professors Robert Delahunty and John C. Yoo, who argue that the Obama
Administration has breached its constitutional duty to enforce immigration
laws against individuals eligible under DACA.167  A formal response to the
argument posted by Yoo and Delahunty will be featured in a forthcoming
essay in the Texas Law Review.168
While my earlier work on prosecutorial discretion goes into great depth
about the history and role of prosecutorial discretion in immigration law, the
instant article is devoted to the role of the judiciary in prosecutorial discre-
tion decisions.  In keeping with this focus, my brief description of the DACA
program’s requirements and the reaction to this program ends here.
USCIS has adopted the agency’s historical position that prosecutorial
discretion decisions, including DACA decisions, are immune from judicial
review.  It has provided its response publicly and in the form of “Frequently
Asked Questions.”169  Specifically:
Q1: Can I appeal USCIS’s determination?
A1: No. You cannot file a motion to reopen or reconsider, and
cannot appeal the decision if USCIS denies your request for con-
sideration of deferred action for childhood arrivals. USCIS will
not review its discretionary determinations. You may request a re-
view using the Service Request Management Tool (SRMT) pro-
cess if you met all of the process guidelines and you believe that
your request was denied due to one of the following errors:
• USCIS denied the request for consideration of deferred ac-
tion for childhood arrivals based on abandonment and you
claim that you did respond to a Request for Evidence
within the prescribed time; or
• USCIS mailed the Request for Evidence to the wrong ad-
dress, even though you had submitted a Form AR-11,
Change of Address, or changed your address online at
166 See, e.g., Elise Foley, Kris Kobach Represents Immigration Agents In Lawsuit Against
Obama Administration, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/08/23/kris-kobach-immigration-lawsuit-obama_n_1825272.html; Complaint, Crane v.
Napolitano, No. 12CV03247 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2012), 2012 WL 3629252.
167 John Yoo and Robert J. Delahunty, The Obama Administration, the Dream Act, and the
Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2144031&http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2144031.
168 See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Response to Yoo and Delahunty, TEX. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2013) (working title) (on file with author).
169 Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Process, UNITED STATES CIT-
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www.uscis.gov before the issuance of the Request for
Evidence.170
Possibly, judicial review should be available under the APA for individ-
uals denied under the DACA program who can meet the standard of abuse
outlined above.  But a thorough analysis about whether such review should
apply is beyond the scope of this Article.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article examined normative arguments about judicial review over
immigration decisions, described the standards outlined in the APA and INA
for judicial review of agency actions, and applied these standards to a por-
tion of federal circuit court decisions involving administrative discretion to
conclude that noncitizens possibly do have a procedural right to challenge a
prosecutorial discretion decision by the agency under the APA because there
exists “more than enough law” against which a judge can determine whether
a decision was rationally made.  The implications of an arbitrary denial of
prosecutorial discretion are real:
[I]t visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of
the right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom.  That
deportation is a penalty—at times a most serious one—cannot be
doubted.  Meticulous care must be exercised lest the procedure by
which he is deprived of that liberty not meet the essential stan-
dards of fairness.171
In closing, the impact of prosecutorial discretion decisions on Latinos is
not merely theoretical. According to the DHS, of the roughly 11.5 million
unauthorized noncitizens living in the United States, 6.8 million are from
Mexico, making it the leading source of unauthorized immigration.172  After
Mexico, the highest populations of unauthorized immigrants are from El Sal-
vador (660,000), Guatemala (520,000), and Honduras (380,000).173  Deferred
action data collected informally from twenty-four different field offices by
ICE between October 1, 2011, and June 30, 2012, reveals that nearly half of
the 698 deferred action cases processed by ICE during this time period in-
volved natives of Mexico (177), Guatemala (49), Honduras (47), El Salvador
(42), and Columbia (21).174  Similarly, DACA data published by USCIS
170 Id.
171 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 162 (1945).
172 MICHALE HOEFER, NANCY RYTINA, & BRYAN BAKER, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF HOME-
LAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IM-
MIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2011, (Mar. 2012), 5,
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2011.pdf.
173 Id.
174 See E-mail from Grace Cheng, Acting Chief, Government Information Law Division
Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Security, to author (Sept. 26, 2012, 1:55 P.M.) (on file with author); see also
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shows that of the 82,361 DACA applications filed with the USCIS as of
September 13, 2012, more than half of these applications (46,391) were filed
by Mexican nationals, followed by El Salvador (3,950), South Korea
(2,837), Honduras (2,265), Guatemala (2,010), and Peru (1,807).175
Given the large proportion of Latinos within the demographic of un-
documented immigrants residing in the United States, and considering that
many exhibit a number of the characteristics explicitly discussed in the June
17 Morton Memo—e.g., long-time residence, enrollment in higher education
or high school, or status as a primary caregiver or breadwinner in a family
that may include a United States citizen—it is unsurprising that Latinos
stand to benefit greatly from the DACA program and other forms of
prosecutorial discretion.176  Even without a detailed statistical analysis on the
impact of prosecutorial discretion on the Latino population, the numbers
above illustrate the significant impact a judicial review design can have on
this population.
Letter from FOIA Officer Catrina M. Pavlik-Kennan to author (Sept. 26, 2012) (on file with
author); Wadhia v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, No. 1:2012cv00231 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 10,
2012) (settled on Oct. 1, 2012).
175 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Process, USCIS OFFICE OF PERFORMANCE AND
QUALITY (Sept. 14, 2012), available at http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=41320
&utm_source=AILA+Mailing&utm_campaign=3403df0a29-AILA8_10_5_12&utm_m
edium=email.  On a related high note, the statistics cited here reflect the first time when the
agency has provided public information about prosecutorial discretion filings and outcomes.
Having pursued data on prosecutorial discretion for several years through the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) and also recommended that the agency provide statistical information
about deferred action, see Wadhia, Sharing Secrets, supra note 4, I find the USCIS’ increased
transparency under the DACA program to be a promising first step to greater transparency
about deferred action more generally.
176 Historically, those individuals who stand to benefit from prosecutorial discretion are
technically deportable under the immigration laws and lack formal relief under such laws.
